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illness among school A households 
originated from sources other than 
the school and support the approach 
of considering school dismissal only 
in conjunction with other community 
mitigation strategies.
In Hong Kong Special 
Administrative Region, People’s 
Republic of China, where all primary 
schools, kindergartens, and child care 
centers were immediately closed for 
14 days after identifi cation of the 
fi rst local case of pandemic (H1N1) 
2009, school closures were concluded 
to have substantially decreased 
transmission (4). The applicability of 
these fi ndings to communities where 
such sweeping measures might be less 
acceptable is unclear.
If school dismissal is considered 
as a strategy, dismissal early in the 
pandemic most likely would have the 
most impact, depending on duration of 
dismissal, other mitigation measures, 
and compliance with social distancing 
recommendations (which was mixed 
during the 2009 pandemic [3,5]). 
Polling of parents whose children 
experienced school dismissal showed 
high acceptance of short-term (3–5 
days) dismissals and low economic 
impact, especially on lower income 
families (3,6). However, dismissal for 
longer periods needs to be balanced by 
the adverse impact on education, loss 
of student services, and socioeconomic 
impact on families (7–9).
This investigation was limited 
by the relatively low response rate; 
however, demographics for the sample 
in our study were similar to those of 
the school as a whole (3). Other 
limitations included the exclusive use 
of reported symptoms to document 
illness, possible unrecognized 
asymptomatic cases, and absence of 
similar data from later in the pandemic. 
The 1-week closure period might not 
have provided enough information to 
capture any effect, and comparative 
data were not available from schools 
that were not dismissed during the 
pandemic. Further investigation is 
needed to evaluate the effi cacy and 
impact of school dismissal, including 
the timing of dismissal in relation to 
recognition of cases in a school or 
community and the impact of school 
dismissal relative to other community 
mitigation strategies.
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Pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 Virus in Swine 
Herds, People’s 
Republic of China
To the Editor: During March 
and early April 2009, a new swine-
origin infl uenza A (H1N1) virus 
emerged in Mexico and the United 
States; this virus subsequently spread 
across the globe by human-to-human 
transmission at an unprecedented rate. 
Pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus also 
affected pigs. On May 2, 2009, the 
Canadian Food Inspection Agency 
notifi ed the World Organisation for 
Animal Health that the novel infl uenza 
A virus had been confi rmed on a pig 
farm in Alberta, Canada. Infection 
of pigs with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
virus has been observed in multiple 
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countries (1). In this study, we report 
transmission of pandemic (H1N1) 
2009 virus from humans to pigs in the 
People’s Republic of China.
During August 2009–April 2010, 
swine infl uenza virus surveillance 
was conducted in the provinces of 
central and eastern China, including 
Henan, Hubei, Hunan, Jiangxi, and 
Anhui. A total of 1,021 samples, 
comprising tracheal mucus swabs 
and lungs, from pigs on 30 farms, 
were collected, and dozens of swine 
infl uenza viruses, H1N1, H1N2, 
H3N8, H9, and H10 subtypes, were 
isolated. Eight isolates were subtype 
H1N1, including 4 novel pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 viruses: A/swine/
Nanchang/3/2010 (H1N1) (Gen
Bank accession nos. JF275917–24), 
A/swine/Nanchang/5/2010 (H1N1)
(GenBank accession nos. JF275933–
40) and A/swine/Nanchang/6/2010 
(H1N1) (GenBank accession nos. 
JF275941–48), which were isolated 
from tracheal mucus, and A/
swine/Nanchang/F9/2010 (H1N1) 
(GenBank accession nos. JF275925–
32), isolated from the lung. Pigs 
from which the novel viruses were 
isolated showed mild respiratory 
signs, including depression, cough, 
and transient increase in body 
temperature. Compared with the 
sequence of A/California/04/2009 
(H1N1), genomic sequencing of the 4 
pandemic viruses showed 15 common 
point mutations, such as polymerase 
basic protein 2, T588I; polymerase 
acidic protein, A70V, P224S, D547E; 
hemagglutinin, P100S, D103E, 
S145P, T214A, S220T, I338V; 
nucleocapsid protein, V100I, H289Y; 
neuraminidase, V106I, N248D; and 
nonstructural protein, I123V.
Recent studies have shown that 
the novel pandemic (H1N1) 2009 
human infl uenza viruses were almost 
avirulent for mice (50% mouse lethal 
dose >106 PFU for A/CA/04/09 [2,3]). 
In this study, mice were anesthetized 
with ketamine/xylazine, as described 
(4) and 50 μL of phosphate-buffered 
saline containing the indicated doses 
(105 50% egg infectious dose) of the 4 
viruses were instilled into anesthetized 
mice through nostrils. Interestingly, 
the 4 pandemic (H1N1) 2009 viruses 
isolated from pigs could cause 
systemic infection on mice. All mice 
had extensive loss of body weight, 
and some of the infected mice died 
within 2 weeks postinfection (data not 
shown).
To detect whether the 4 isolated 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 viruses could 
cause clinical diseases in pigs and 
what kinds of pathologic damage 
could be induced in infected pigs, pigs 
were intratracheally challenged with 
the 4 pandemic (H1N1) 2009 viruses 
at a dose of 107 50% egg infectious 
dose and monitored for clinical signs 
and pathologic changes. Clinical 
signs in pigs were mild, and no deaths 
occurred. Except for slightly labored 
breathing, no infected pigs showed 
dominant signs, such as cough, nasal 
discharge, facial edema, and dyspnea. 
Body temperatures of infected pigs 
started to increase at 2 days 
postinfection (dpi), peaked ≈3 dpi 
at 41.5°C, and returned to the initial 
temperature by 5 dpi.
We observed necrosis of the 
tracheal wall and pneumonia foci in 
the 4 pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus–
infected pigs. Hematoxylin and 
eosin–stained sections of the trachea 
from the infected pigs showed mild 
necrotizing tracheitis. The necrotic 
epithelial cells were present in the 
lumen, and a mixed infl ammatory 
cell infi ltrate was present throughout 
(Figure). In the lung, we also observed 
alveolar septal edema and interstitial 
infl ammatory cell infi ltrates, as well 
as histologic changes, including 
alveolar epithelial hyperplasia, a 
mixed infl ammatory infi ltrate, and 
interstitium broadening (Figure). 
Additionally, immunohistochemical 
analysis for the distribution of viral 
antigens showed positive staining in 
bronchial epithelial cells and alveolar 
pneumocytes.
1758 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 17, No. 9, September 2011
Figure. Hematoxylin and eosin–stained trachea and lung controls and samples from 
pigs infected with pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus. A) Control trachea sample; B) mixed 
infl ammatory cell infi ltrate present throughout trachea sample from infected pig; C) control 
lung sample; D) mixed infl ammatory infi ltrate and interstitium broadening in lung sample 
from infected pig. Original magnifi cations: panels A and B, ×40; panels C and D, ×10. A 
color version of this fi gure is available online (www.cdc.gov/EID/17/9/101916-F.htm).
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Previous studies showed that 
pandemic (H1N1) 2009 may have 
become established in swine 
populations in Canada, Norway, and 
Hong Kong (1,5–8). The human-
to-pig transmission of pandemic 
(H1N1) 2009 may substantially 
affect virus evolution and subsequent 
epidemiology. Although the pandemic 
was mild, the virus could develop 
further reassortment in swine and gain 
virulence. On the other hand, subtype 
H5N1 and H9N2 viruses have become 
established in pigs, so the introduction 
of pandemic (H1N1) 2009 virus to 
pigs has provided the possibility for 
the incorporation of avian virus genes 
into mammalian-adapted viruses. 
That transmission could occur from 
humans to pigs and vice versa is 
especially troublesome. Given the 
possible production of novel viruses 
of potential threat to public health, 
we should emphasize infl uenza 
surveillance in pigs and establishment 
of the genetic basis of the viral 
genome for rapidly identifying such 
reassortment events.
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Pulmonary Disease 
Associated with 
Nontuberculous 
Mycobacteria, 
Oregon, USA
To the Editor: Nontuberculous 
mycobacteria (NTM) are environ-
mental organisms ubiquitous in 
soil and water, including municipal 
water supplies. When inhaled, these 
organisms cause chronic, severe 
lung disease in susceptible persons 
(1). Recent epidemiologic studies 
suggest NTM pulmonary disease 
is increasingly prevalent in North 
America, with annual incidence rates 
of 13 cases per 100,000 population 
in persons >50 years of age and 
2–4-fold higher in older age groups 
(2–4). The current distribution of 
pulmonary NTM disease has been 
poorly characterized with regard 
to environment, climate, and other 
factors.
We recently performed a 
statewide NTM surveillance project 
in Oregon, United States, where we 
documented higher pulmonary disease 
rates within the moister, temperate 
western regions of the state. Oregon 
is bisected north-south by mountains 
into 2 distinct climate zones. Western 
Oregon, where 87% of the state’s 
population lives, is temperate and 
wet; eastern Oregon is primarily rural, 
with an arid, high desert climate. Our 
goal was to evaluate whether disease 
clustering within the state could be 
explained by population density.
For all Oregon residents who 
had newly diagnosed and existing 
pulmonary NTM disease during 2005 
and 2006, we used case-patient home 
ZIP code and county of residence to 
construct statewide disease maps 
(4). We obtained state ZIP code and 
county-level census data for 2005 
and 2006 from the Portland State 
University Population Research 
Center and used Oregon Offi ce of 
Rural Health criteria to designate 
 Emerging Infectious Diseases • www.cdc.gov/eid • Vol. 17, No. 9, September 2011 1759
1These authors contributed equally to this 
article.
